Basic doctrinal analysis:
This discussion on definitions, definienda, and illustrations is from Dan Perdue, Debate in Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 68-70
The definition of definition is:
རྫས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་
that which is a triply qualified substantial existent
A definition is called a “substantial existent” (རྫས་ཡོད་) because it is the actual object, the meaning or referent of its definiendum. According to Jam-by-gya-tso's presentation of Collected Topics, the three qualities of a definition are:
For example, that which is suitable as a hue is the triply qualified substantial existent of color because (1) in general, it is a definition, (2) it is established with its illustrations, and (3) it does not define anything other than color.
First, that which is suitable as a hue is renowned as a definition, not a definiendum. Second, that which is suitable as a hue is established with its illustrations such as that which is suitable as a red hue, that which is suitable as a blue hue, and so forth. One knows that which is suitable as a hue in dependence on knowing its illustrations. Third, that which is suitable as a hue is not the definition of anything other than color. A definition cannot have more than one definiendum.
The definition of definiendum is:
བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་
that which is a triply qualified imputed existent
A definiendum is called an “imputed existent” (བཏགས་ཡོད་) because it is the name imputed to its definition. However, this does not meant hat whatever is a definiendum is necessarily a name. For instance, color is not a name, for it is not a sound but a visible object. However, the word “color” is a name or conventionality commonly accepted as meaning that which is suitable as a hue.
There is also a description of the three qualities of a definiendum.
For example, color is the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is suitable as a hue because (1) in general, it is a definiendum, (2) it is established with its illustrations, and (3) it is not the definiendum of anything other than that which is suitable as a hue. In general, color is renowned as a definiendum, and it is established with its illustrations such as blue, green, and so forth.
Both definitions and definienda are established with their illustrations (མཚན་གཞི་). An illustration of a color, is, for instance, red. An illustration of an impermanent phenomenon is, for instance, a pot. An illustration is defined as:
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྐབས་སུ་བབ་པའི་མཚོན་བྱ་མཚོན་པའི་གཞིར་གྱུར་པ་
that which serves as a basis for illustrating the appropriate definiendum by way of [its] own definition
Just as a definition must be something that one might have ascertained without necessarily having ascertained its definiendum, so an illustration must be something that one might have ascertained without necessarily having ascertained that which it illustrates; otherwise there would be no need for an illustration.
For instance, it is conceivable that one might know red without knowing color in general or one might know a pot without knowing impermanent phenomenon in general. An illustration serves as a basis for illustrating something. If it embodied all of the particular qualities of what it illustrates or if merely by knowing it one would have to know what it purports to illustrate, then it would not be a proper illustration.
An illustration must serve as a basis which is able to cause one to know something. For instance, even though a gold pot is an instance of a pot, it is not an illustration of a pot because if one has ascertained a gold by by valid cognition, then one necessarily has ascertained a pot by valid cognition.
As a side note, definiendum and definition are used as examples of phenomena that are, and are not, themselves (respectively). While definiendum is a definiendum, definition is not a definition. Definition is, in fact, a definiendum. Definition has a definition but is not a definition (the definition of definition was given above). Thus definiendum is a phenomenon that is itself while definition is a phenomenon that is not itself.
བདག་མེད་པ་ “the selfless” → The broadest category of division of the Buddhist world, since everything, whether it exists or not, is selfless.
Selflessness is one of the set of four key traditional doctrines in Buddhism, the set being, loosely state: selflessness or emptiness, the unsatisfactory nature of the mind, impermanence, peace of nirvana. This set is known as the Four Seals, or ཕྱག་རྒྱ་བཞི་. The four seals are understood to define what is a Buddhist tenet system.
More correctly stated, the four seals are:
- all compounded phenomena are impermanent
- all contaminated phenomena are unsatisfactory
- all phenomena are without a self
- nirvana is peace
བདག་མེད་ refers to a the lack of a person that is partless, permanent, and independent—one of various types of selves that do not exist.
The selfless is then divided into two categories: existent and non-existent.
བདག་མེད་པ་
Non-existents are not phenomenon. The definition of phenomenon is holds its own entity. Something that does not exist cannot hold it's own entity. Wilson (pp. 142-144) mixes up his language on non-existents, calling them "non-existent phenomenon" which is an oxymoron. He should just say “non-existents” not “non-existent phenomena.”
Three groups of non-existents:
Examples of non-existents:
མོ་གཤམ་གྱི་བུ་ child of a barren woman
གངས་རི་སྔོན་པོ་ blue snow mountains
བདག་ self
རྟག་གཅིག་རང་དབང་ཅན་གྱི་གང་ཟག་ person[s] that are permanent, partless, and independent
རྟག་ permanent
གཅིག་ one
རང་དབང་ཅན་ [own-power-possessing] independent
གྱི་ 6th case connective particle creating adjective-noun phrase
གང་ཟག་ person [literally means something like "full of crap"]
གང་ཟག་ means person, butliterally means something like “full of crap.” It can have the connotation of being slightly negative, of being a person mired in samsara and afflictions. A note from the UMA Tibet dictionary says: "Ken-sur Nga-wang-lek-den etymologized this is "full-fall", i.e., one who is filled with the afflictions and has fallen into cyclic existence. As he said, this is not true of all persons, because even a Buddha, for instance, is a person."
སྐྱེས་བུ་ on the other hand, has a more positive or neutral connotation. UMA defines it as: being, creature, person.
Also remember that in Buddhism, “person” includes not just human beings but animals as well. The definition of གང་ཟག་ is:
ཕུང་པོ་ལྔ་པོ་གང་རུང་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བཏགས་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ།
A being imputed in dependence upon any among the five aggregates
You will also see སེམས་ཅན་, which literally means mind-possessor. This is frequently seen in the phrase སེམས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་, all sentient beings.
འགྲོ་བ་ is also common, meaning literally migrator or go-er, but meaning a being trapped in samsara and migrating from life to life.
It would be nice to find out what the actual pervasion is between these four terms. I believe གང་ཟག་, སྐྱེས་བུ་, and སེམས་ཅན་ are equivalent. འགྲོ་བ་, however, cannot be equivalent because if a Buddha is a གང་ཟག་, a person, he or she cannot also be a འགྲོ་བ་.
These phenomena are equivalent, དོན་གཅིག་, to existent:
Existents are categorized in a number of different ways. The most basic division is into permanent and impermanent.
འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ uncompounded space: an absence of obstructive contact
ནམ་མཁའ་ space
འདུས་མ་བྱས་ uncompounded (permanent)
འདུས་བྱས་ compounded (impermanent)
To be impermanent is to be momentary, སྐད་ཅིག་མ་
Examples of impermanent phenomena:
སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ momentary
རྒྱུ་ cause
རྐྱེན་ condition
འབྲས་བུ་ effect
བྱས་པ་ produced, product
འདུས་བྱས་ compounded
དངོས་པོ་ functioning thing
མི་རྟག་པ་
ཀུན་ཏུ་བཟང་པོ་ Samantabhadra
རྐྱེན་ condition
སྐྱ་ body [H]
གངས་ snow
ངག་ speech
དངོས་པོ་ functioning thing
ཉོན་མོངས་ affliction, kleśa
ཐུགས་ mind [H]
ཐུགས་རྗེ་ compassion [H]
འདུ་བྱེད་ compositional factor
འདུས་མ་བྱས་ uncompounded phenomena
ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་ non-associated compositional factor
ནམ་མཁའ་ space
གནས་བརྟན་ elder
བུ་ child, son
བྱས་པ་ product, that which has been made
མོ་གཤམ་ barren woman
ཞི་བ་ peace, pacification
གཞི་གྲུབ་ basic existent
རང་དབང་ independence
རི་བོང་ rabbit
རྭ་ horn
ལུས་ body
ཡི་གི་ letter
ཡིད་ mind, mentality
ཤེས་བྱ་ object of knowledge
གསུང་ speech [H]
གསུང་འབུམ་ collected works
མཁྱེན་ know, realize – V p54
འགྲོ་ go – III p93
རྙེད་ find, obtain, be found – V p171
བརྙེས་ past form of རྙེད་
རྟོགས་ realize, understand, know – V p189
ཤེས་ know, understand – V p434
བྱེད་, བྱས་, བྱ་, བྱོས་ do, make, perform, act – V p296
དཀའ་ difficult
དེ་ that
དེ་དག་ those
འབའ་ཞིག་ only
རང་དབང་ཅན་ independent
ཅུང་ཟད་ a little
ཇི་ལྟར་ how
དེ་ལྟར་ thus
ཆེད་ purpose, [for] the sake [of]
རྗེས་ after
སྟེང་ top, [on] top [of]
མདུན་ front, [in] front [of]